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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A SUBJECTIVE APPROACH TO INFORMED
CONSENT IN OKLAHOMA. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla.
1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent decision of Scott v. Bradford,' the Oklahoma
Supreme Court officially2 adopted the doctrine of informed consent in
medical malpractice suits. This doctrine imposes a duty on a physician
or surgeon to inform the patient about what is to be done during treat-
ment or surgery, the risks involved, and any alternatives to the contem-
plated treatment. In a marked departure from the majority of
jurisdictions which have adopted the informed consent doctrine, how-
ever, the court declined to impose an objective standard of whether a
"reasonable patient" would have declined the proposed treatment if he
had been adequately informed of all the material risks.3 Instead, the
court explicitly stated, becoming one of the first courts to do so,4 that
1. 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
2. In Martin v. Stratton, 515 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1973), the Oklahoma Supreme Court implic-
itly approved the doctrine of informed consent and stated its basic principles, but left its adoption
to a later time. See Lambert v. Park, 597 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1979), where the federal court held,
in a diversity case, that informed consent is a part of Oklahoma law.
3. This particular aspect of the informed consent doctrine is an issue of causation, i e., a
causal connection between the nondisclosure of the required information and the injury sustained
by the plaintiff. Most courts have failed to address the problem of whether causation is to be
found by reference to an objective, reasonable man standard or to a subjective, "particular pa-
tient" standard. See Meisel, The Expansion of Liabilityfor MedicalAccidents: From Negligence to
Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REy. 51, 108-09 (1977). Most jurisdic-
tions, however, have adopted an objective test on the issue of causation. Id. at 109. See also Note,
Who's Afraid of Informed Consent? An Affirmative Approach to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 44
BROOKLYN L. RE. 241,263 (1978); Note, Informed Consent Liability, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 696, 706
(1977). A minority ofjurisdictions implicitly adhere to a subjective approach, although they are
seemingly unaware that the issue of causation has been raised. Meisel, supra, at 108 n.161. See
Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d.251, 275 (Alaska 1975); Beauvais v. Notre Dame Hosp., 387 A.2d
689, 691 (R.I. 1978); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, _ 295 A.2d 676, 690 (1972); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex. 1975); ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wash.
2d 12, -_, 499 P.2d 1, 11 (1972).
4. See note 3 supra.
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the standard to be applied is a subjective one, that is, whether that par-
ticular patient would still have consented to the treatment, reasonable
choice or otherwise.5 This note will briefly discuss the history and de-
velopment of the law of informed consent, the current status of the law,
the Scott decision, and the implications of the use of a subjective stan-
dard for the issue of causation.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF INFORMED CONSENT
The doctrine of informed consent is founded upon the idea that
each individual has the right to determine what is to be done to his
person6 and originally developed out of the traditional tort of battery.7
[I]t is easy to understahd why assault and battery principles
were assimilated into the law of physician-patient relation-
ships when no other adequate theory of recovery then existed:
the protected interest would be jeopardized if the individual's
absolute right to be free from unwanted procedures on his
body were made to depend on the subjective intentions or
motivations of the physician.'
Battery would be an appropriate cause of action
where the patient alleges either that he did not consent to the
treatment rendered or that his consent was ineffective because
the physician did not inform him of what would be done in
the course of treatment. Where, however, the patient alleges
that his consent was vitiated by the doctor's failure to disclose
to him the risks of the proposed procedure or the available
alternatives, his cause of action is in negligence, not battery.9
5. The court recognized that the use of an objective standard jeopardizes the patient's right
of self-determination and specifically rejected that approach. 606 P.2d at 559.
6. Id. at 556. One-half century ago, Justice Cardozo, in the oft-cited case of Schloendorff v.
Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914), made the following observation: "Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent, commits an
assault, for which he is liable in damages." Id. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93. An even earlier case
involving consent to medical treatment was an Oklahoma case, Rolater v. Strain, 390 Okla. 572,
137 P. 96 (1913). In Rolater, the patient agreed to an operation on her toe, but expressly advised
the physician not to remove any bones. During the course of the operation, the physician re-
moved a sesamoid bone. The court held that the removal of the bone was unlawful and consti-
tuted a technical assault and battery.
7. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 18, at 102-06 (4th ed. 1971). See also
Rolater v. Strain, 390 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96 (1913).
8. Comment, New Trends in Informed Consent? 54 NEB. L. REv. 66, 68 (1975).
9. Comment, The Evolution of the Doctrine ofInformed Consent, 12 GA. L. REV. 581, 582
(1978). There is no unanimity as to the theory of recovery which a plaintiff must adopt when his
suit alleges a failure by a physician to adequately disclose the risks and alternatives of a proposed
procedure. Some courts have held that any treatment given without informing the patient of its
[Vol. 15:665
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Thus, the physician may be held liable for his actions where, even
though he obtained consent to treatment, he has not informed the pa-
tient of risks and alternatives of that treatment. 10 This is true regard-
less of the due care the physician utilized during the procedure,
assuming there is injury resulting."I This theory, which today is known
as the doctrine of informed consent, imposes a duty upon a physician
separate from his responsibilities to skillfully diagnose and treat the
patient's ills.' 2 This new awareness of patients' informational needs
was influenced by the simultaneous growth of product liability and
consumer law.13 What the doctrine of informed consent sought to add
to the physician's standard of care is the proposition that physicians are
under an affirmative duty to offer to acquaint patients with the impor-
tant risks and plausible alternatives to the proposed procedure. Pro-
ceeding from the law of battery, the courts reasoned that significant
protection of a patient's right to decide his medical fate required not
merely perfunctory assent but a truly "informed consent," based on an
adequate understanding of the medical alternatives available to him.
Failure to obtain such consent is negligence.' 4
inherent risks vitiates the consent and allows suit based upon a battery theory. See., e.g., Bang v.
Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958); Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144,
223 A.2d 663 (1966). Most jurisdictions, classify the physician's duty as a question of negligence
because of the absence of the elements of any willful intent by the physician to harm the patient.
See Mallett v. Pirkey, 171 Colo. 271, 466 P.2d 466 (1970); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350
P.2d 1093 (1960), claried, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82
(Me. 1974).
10. 606 P.2d at 557.
11. Id. See Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 657-58
(1968).
12. See, e.g., Martin v. Stratton, 515 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Okla. 1973); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110
R.I. 606,_. 295 A.2d 676, 685 (1972). "This requirement. . . is, legally speaking, as essential as a
physician's care and skill in the performance of the therapy. 606 P.2d at 557 (emphasis in origi-
nal).
13. Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REv. 137, 147-48
(1977). The author also recognized that the law of fraud and deceit has protected patients from
doctors' flagrant misrepresentations. Id. at 148 (citing I D. LOUISELL, H. WILLIAMS & J. KA-
LISCH, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 4.15, at 131-32 (1973)).
14. Id. Scott also recognized that "true consent to what happens to one's self is the informed
exercise of a choice. This entails an opportunity to evaluate the options available and the risks
attendant upon each. It is the prerogative of every patient to chart his own course and determine
which direction he will take." 606 P.2d at 557. A practical reason for resort to the doctrine by
plaintiffs' attorneys is the inability to prove specific acts of negligence or to invoke the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.1, at 58, n.15 (Supp. 1968).
The converse of the requirement of adequate disclosure is that a patient's willingness to encounter
collateral risks of a chosen therapy will not relieve a doctor of liability for negligence in perform-
ance of the therapy. Waltz & Scheunerman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628,
629 (1970) (citing Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962); Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal. 2d
338, 217 P.2d 422 (1950)).
1980]
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One of the first decisions pronouncing this new medical duty was
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees.15 In Salgo,
the California District Court of Appeals "grounded the disclosure re-
quirement in negligence law holding that a physician violates a duty to
his patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts
which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the
patient to the proposed treatment." 6 The court, in announcing an ab-
solute duty to disclose such necessary facts, clearly wished to extend the
legal protection given to a patient's right of self-determination. The
court, however, stated that this new duty to inform was not absolute,
but instead subject to the physician's discretion. 17 The court seemed to
graft "a new duty of disclosure onto the professional standard of care,
apparently relieving the plaintiff of the burden of proving [malprac-
tice].""8 Under the "professional standard of care" rule, a physician
need only inform a patient in conformance with the prevailing medical
practice in the community.' 9 The law was left in confusion.
Canterbury v. Spence,z° one of the most influential2' informed con-
sent decisions, departed from the law as laid down by the Salgo court.
Canterbury eliminated the professional standard of care rule with re-
spect to disclosure requirements. Instead, the court held that the stan-
dard measuring performance of the duty of disclosure is conduct which
is reasonable under the circumstances.
We cannot ignore the fact that to bind disclosure obliga-
15. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
16. 606 P.2d at 557. See also 154 Cal. App. 2d at 578, 317 P.2d at 181. There is a dispute
about whether this language is framed in terms of battery or negligence law. Conpare Scott v.
Bradford, 606 P.2d at 557 (negligence) with Katz, supra note 13, at 149 (battery).
17. 154 Cal. App. 2d at , 317 P.2d at 181. The court recognized "that the patient's mental
and emotional condition is important . . ., and that in discussing the element of risk a certain
amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an
informed consent." Id. (citation omitted).
18. Katz, supra note 13, at 150.
19. A majority of jurisdictions still follow a professional standard. See, e.g., DiFilippo v.
Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627
(1963). For a list ofjurisdictions which judge the adequacy of the disclosure by the professional
standard, see Seidelson, Medical Malpractice: Informed Consent Cases in "Full-Disclosure" Juris-
dictions, 14 DUQ. L. REv. 309, 309 n.1 (1976).
20. 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). See Murphy, Canter-
bury v. Spence-The Case anda Few Comments, 11 FORUM 716 (1976). An important, oft-cited
decision preceding Canterbury is Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, clarp/ed, 187
Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960). The court's decision in Natanson was ambiguous. The court used
language which expanded the law of battery and, at the same time, judged the physician's behav-
ior by the professional standard of care under the law of negligence. 186 Kan. at 411,350 P.2d at
1107. For a discussion of the Natanson case, see Katz, supra note 13, at 150-54.
21. Seidelson, supra note 19, at 318 n.20.
[Vol. 15:665
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tions to medical usage is to arrogate the decision on revelation
to the physician alone. Respect for the patient's right of self-
determination on particular therapy demands a standard set
by law for physicians rather than one which physicians may
or may not impose upon themselves.22
The physician's communications must be sufficient to enable a patient
to make an intelligent choice. 23 This standard is commonly known as
full disclosure.24
III. THE CURRENT STATUS OF INFORMED CONSENT
A medical malpractice action based on the lack of an informed
consent is divided into three elements: breach of the duty to disclose,
causation, and injury.25 As to the first element, there is a marked diver-
gence of opinion among the jurisdictions as to the extent of disclosure
which a physician must make to a patient as a condition precedent to
securing the patient's informed consent to a contemplated therapeutic
procedure. After Canterbury,26 some other jurisdictions adopted the
standard of full disclosure.27 The professional standard outlined in
Salgo is, however, currently the prevailing view.28 Because Oklahoma
is now a full disclosure jurisdiction after Scott v. Bradford,29 discussion
22. 464 F.2d at 784. For a discussion of each of the two approaches, see generally Plante, An
Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639 (1968); Comment, Informed Consent in
Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396 (1967); Comment, Valid Consent to Medical Treat-
ment: Need the Patient Know? 4 DUQ. L. REV. 450 (1966).
23. The adoption of a lay standard eliminated the need for expert testimony. "Experts are
unnecessary to a showing of the materiality of the risk to a patient's decision on treatment, or to
the reasonably expectable effect of risk disclosure on the decision." 464 F.2d at 792. The court in
Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972) stated, "The patient's right to make up his
mind should not be delegated to a medical group-many of whom have no idea as to his informa-
tional needs. The doctor-patient relationship is a one-on-one affair. What is a reasonable disclo-
sure in one instance may not be reasonable in another. This variability negates the need of the
plaintiff showing what other doctors may tell other patients." Id. at - 295 A.2d at 688.
24. See Seidelson, supra note 19, at 312.
25. 606 P.2d at 558. See also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
26. See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text.
27. Seidelson, supra note 19, at 312-13. The author notes that some courts which have
adopted the full disclosure rule may have been influenced toward that conclusion by the "conspir-
acy of silence." Id. at 313. The court in Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 286 A.2d 647,
(1971), in rejecting the professional standard, stated that "as a practical matter, we must consider
the plaintiffs difficulty in finding a physician who would breach the "community of silence" by
testifying against the interest of one of his professional colleagues." Id. at 267, 286 A.2d at 650.
28. See Siedelson, supra note 19, at 309 n.1 for a complete list of jurisdictions which follow
the professional standard.
29. 606 P.2d at 558.
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will focus on informed consent in a full disclosure jurisdiction.
The gravamen of a complaint in an informed consent case requir-
ing full disclosure is that the defendant failed to advise the patient of
all material risks incident to the trqatment. This raises a crucial ques-
tion: What constitutes a material risk? In Canterbury, the court
adopted the test that "a risk is thus material when a reasonable person,
in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's posi-
tion, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks
in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy. '30
Clearly, the Canterbury language contemplates an objective, rather
than a subjective, standard for determining materiality of a physician's
disclosure requirements. Thus, a risk is material only if it would be
likely to affect the decision of a reasonable person in the patient's cir-
cumstances. The Canterbury court reasoned that the use of a subjective
standard would make an undue demand upon medical practitioners,
whose conduct, like that of others, is to be measured in terms of reason-
ableness. 3' The objective approach in determining materiality is pres-
ently followed by a majority of jurisdictions utilizing full disclosure in
informed consent.32
Consistent with its adoption of an objective standard for measur-
ing the adequacy of disclosure, Canterbury also adopted an objective
approach for determining if consent by the patient would have been
extended or withheld, had an adequate disclosure been made.33 This is
the traditional tort requirement that the injury to the plaintiff be proxi-
mately caused by the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff must
prove that he would not have agreed to the proposed therapy if disclo-
sure had been adequate.34 The Canterbury court held that the question
30. 464 F.2d at 787 (quoting Waltz & Scheunerman, supra note 14, at 640).
31. Waltz and Scheunerman state that
[t]he ideal rule would require that a risk be disclosed when the patient would attach
importance to it, alone or in combination with others, in making his decision whether or
not to consent to the therapy in question. But a physician obviously cannot be required
to know the inner workings of his patient's mind. He can, however, employ his general
experience with people. He can be required to exercise a sense of how the average,
reasonable man would probably react.
Waltz & Scheunerman, supra note 14, at 640 (footnotes omitted). The objective approach in de-
termining materiality has been criticized because it undermines the patient's right of self-determi-
nation. See Seidelson, supra note 19, at 318-27; Katz, supra note 13, at 158-60.
32. Seidelson, supra note 19, at 327 n.31.
33. 464 F.2d at 791.
34. Id. at 789. This basic principle of tort law has been commented on frequently in the
medical malpractice area. See, e.g., Johnson, Medical Maipractice-Doctrines of Res Ipsa Loquitur
and Informed Consent, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 182 (1965); Comment, Informed Consent in Medical
Malfpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 1396 (1967).
[Vol. 15:665
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for the jury is not what the patient would have decided to do had the
physician adequately informed him, but instead "what a prudent per-
son in the patient's position would have decided if suitably informed of
all perils bearing significance."35 Such an objective standard, the court
said, will prevent the patient's testimony, perhaps influenced by hind-
sight and bitterness, from threatening to dominate the findings, and
will ease the fact-finding process and better assure the truth as its prod-
uct.
3 6
"The final element of [the] cause of action is that of injury. The
risk must actually materialize and plaintiff must have been injured as a
result of submitting to the treatment. Absent occurrence of the undis-
closed risk, a physician's failure to reveal its possibility is not actiona-
ble."37 One commentator, however, has argued that "a citizen can be
wronged without being 'harmed', that his dignity as a human being has
been violated and that an assault has taken place the moment the de-
ceiving authority commences therapy . . . even if beneficial."' 38 The
courts have not gone so far. While as a matter of jurisprudence, liabil-
ity should perhaps be imposed in such instances, the practical impact in
all likelihood would be minimal, since only nominal damages are
awarded for such injuries.39
35. 464 F.2d at 791 (footnote omitted) (citing Waltz & Scheunerman, supra note 14, at 648).
36. Id. at 790-91. For criticism and analysis of the objective approach to causation see notes
60-75 infra and accompanying text.
Just as other jurisdictions have begun to adopt the Canterbury holding requiring that the
adequacy of disclosure be measured by an objective lay standard rather than the professional
standard of care, so too have many jurisdictions followed Canterbury on the issue of causation.
See Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 422 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974); Bowers v.
Garfield, 382 F. Supp. 503, 505-06 (E.D. Pa.) afd, 503 F.2d 1398 (1974); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.
3d 229, 246, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972); Funke v. Fieldman, 212 Kan. 524, 537,
512 P.2d 539, 550 (1973); Small v. Gifford Memorial Hosp., 133 Vt. 551, - 349 A.2d 703, 707
(1975); Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash. App. 230, 236-37, 523 P.2d 211, 216 (1974); Trogun v.
Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 603, 207 N.W.2d 297, 315 (1973).
37. 606 P.2d at 559 (citing Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82 (Me. 1974); Hales v. Pittman, 118
Ariz. 305, 576 P.2d 493 (1978)). See Seidelson, supra note 19, at 322-24.
38. Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell Some Reflections on Human Digniy, Entrapment, In-
formed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 691 (1975). See also Riskin, Informed
Consent: Lookingfor the Action, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 580, 589; Capron, Informed Consent in Cata-
strophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 340, 423 (1974).
39. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 81, at 286 (1935). One
author states that successful informed consent plaintiffs, under present law, may be compensated
for their dignitary injuries sub rosa by additional damages for pain and suffering; dignitary inju-
ries, however, ought to be recognized as compensable per se, and openly included as an element of
damages. Katz, supra note 13, at 161 n.76.
1980]
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IV. AN ANALYSIS OF Sco7T V BRADFORD
Mrs. Scott's personal physician advised her after a routine exami-
nation that she had several fibroid tumors on her uterus. She was
referred to Dr. Bradford, the defendant surgeon. Dr. Bradford deter-
mined that a hysterectomy was necessary and admitted her to the hos-
pital, where she signed a routine consent form prior to surgery. After
the surgery, Mrs. Scott became incontinent and visited another physi-
cian who diagnosed a vesicovaginal fistula which permitted urine to
escape from her bladder into her vagina. Mrs. Scott was then referred
to a urologist who, after three operations, succeeded in closing the
fistula.4 °
The plaintiff, joined by her husband, filed the action alleging med-
ical malpractice, claiming that the defendant surgeon failed to disclose
fully the risks involved or advise her of available alternatives. She fur-
ther alleged that, had full disclosure been made, she would not have
proceeded with the hysterectomy. When submitted to the jury, the
plaintiffs' instructions referring to the doctrine of informed consent
were not given. The jury subsequently found for the defendant and the
plaintiffs appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.4
The plaintiffs' major contention on appeal was that the trial court
erred in not submitting an instruction on informed consent.4" The re-
quested instruction stated that a failure to disclose material risks of a
proposed treatment and the alternatives to that treatment constituted
negligence. Furthermore, the instruction told the jury to regard a risk
as material if a reasonable person, in what the physician knew or
should have known to be the plaintiff's position, would attach risk to
the proposed therapy-the Canterbury objective standard.43  The
Oklahoma Supreme Court was thus presented with the issues of
whether Oklahoma adhered to the doctrine of informed consent as the
basis of an action for medical malpractice, and if so, whether the re-
40. 606 P.2d at 556.
41. Id.
42. Id. On appeal, plaintiffs first contention was that the trial court erred in failing to instruct
the jury on the issue of defendant's abandonment of the plaintiff Mrs. Scott after her surgery. The
plaintiffs did not, however, set out the two requested instructions on this issue in their brief as
required by the rules of the court. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 1, Rule 15 (1971). The plain-
tiffs also failed to offer any authority to suggest that a cause of action based solely on abandon-
ment existed. 606 P.2d at 556. Nevertheless, the court reviewed the evidence, and failed to find
any willful abandonment such as would warrant a separate instruction. Id. The court stated that
abandonment, an indication of negligence, was covered by the trial court's general instructions on
negligence and proximate cause. It, therefore, found no reversible error in this area. Id.
43. 606 P.2d at 556.
[Vol. 15:665
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quested instructions adequately advised the jury of the defendant's
duty.44
After briefly discussing the general law of informed consent, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted a Canterbury full disclosure ap-
proach.
A patient's right to make up his mind whether to undergo
treatment should not be delegated to the local medical
group. .... [T]he scope of a physician's communication must
be measured by [the] patient's need to know enough to enable
him to make an intelligent choice. ... [F]ull disclosure of all
material risks incident to treatment must be made.
45
In a departure from the Canterbury holding, however, the Court de-
fined a risk as "material if it would be likely to affect [that] patient's
decision." 46  While the Canterbury court had rejected the subjective
standard as being an undue burden on the medical practitioner,47 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Scott would appear to have opted for a
subjective standard of materiality,41 preserving the patient's right of
self-determination. This standard is consistent with the court's ap-
proach to the issue of causation.49
44. Id.
45. 606 P.2d at 558. The court also stated, "There is no bright line separating the material
from the immaterial; it is a question of fact. . . .When non-disclosure of a particular risk is open
to debate, the issue is for the finder of facts." Id.
46. Id.
47. 464 F.2d at 787. The Canterbury court also stated,
Consonantly with orthodox negligence doctrine, the physician's liability for nondisclo-
sure is to be determined on the basis of foresight, not hindsight; no less than any other
aspect of negligence, the issue on nondisclosure must be approached from the viewpoint
of the reasonableness of the physician's divulgence in terms of what he knows or should
know to be the patient's informational needs. If, but only if, the fact-finder can say that
the physician's communication was unreasonably inadequate is an imposition of liability
legally or morally justified.
Id.
48. The Oklahoma court is perhaps the first court to use a subjective approach in determin-
ing the materiality of a risk. Seidelson, supra note 19, at 327 n.31. Professor Seidelson criticizes
the objective standard because the jury's ultimate reasonable person will be a creature of fiction.
The physician will have had no professional relationship with that fictitious being, no
opportunity to observe it, no opportunity to talk with it, and no opportunity to assess its
comprehension of and reaction to the physician's disclosure. What reason is there to
assume that the physician's disclosure would have been more likely to reveal all of the
material risks to this creature of fiction than to the actual patient?
Id. at 326. In his article, Professor Seidelson advocates a subjective standard and would amend
the language of Canterbury to read: "A risk is material when the patient would attach significance
to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy." Id. at
327. While the language used by the Oklahoma court is not identical, it is similar in its approach.
The court rejects a "reasonable person in the patient's position" standard, and instead looks to the
significance that the particular patient would attach to the risk. 606 P.2d at 558.
49. See notes 53-60 supra and accompanying text. The court in making its decision was
9
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The Scott court noted several exceptions which created a privilege
for the physician not to disclose. First, there is no need to disclose risks
that either ought to be known by everyone or are already known to the
patient.50 Second, the court stated that the primary duty of the physi-
cian is to do what is best for his patient, and where full disclosure
would be detrimental to the patient's total care and best interests, a
physician may withhold such disclosure. 5' Third, where there is an
emergency situation and the patient is in no condition to determine for
himself whether treatment should be administered, the physician may
forego full disclosure.5 2
aware of the law review articles that have criticized the use of an objective approach. See 606
P.2d at 559 n. 14. As one author stated:
The physician cannot know with exactitude what the patient would consider important;
and little in his medical training and experience has as yet prepared him, if it ever can, to
sense how patients will react to disclosures. Moreover, patients differ widely in their
informational needs. For all these reasons, safeguarding self-determination requires ask-
ing the patient whether he understands what has been explained to him in order to assess
whether his informational needs have been satisfied. Physicians need not "sense" how
the patient will react or "second guess" him; instead, they should explore what questions
need further explanation.
Katz, supra note 13, at 150-60. Professor Seidelson argues that an informed consent case is differ-
ent from a typical negligence action and thus should be decided by a different standard because of
(I) [the] superior knowledge impliedly asserted by the physician and impliedly accepted
by the patient, (2) the inducement and reliance by physician and patient, respectively,
inherent in the professional relationship, and (3) a desire to protect the plaintiff, in the
general sense of making recovery feasible and in the specific sense of preserving his right
of self-determination.
Seidelson, supra note 19, at 324. These distinctions between the two types of cases "tend to sup-
port the conclusion that use of the objective standard in negligence actions generally does not
justify its use in determining the adequacy of physician's disclosure to patient." Id.
50. 606 P.2d at 558 (citing Yeates v. Harms, 193 Kan. 320, 393 P.2d 982 (1964)). The Canter-
bury court held that a physician need not disclose the risks common to all operations, such as the
risk of infection, of which the average person would already be aware. 464 F.2d at 788. See also
Fleishman v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 94 N.J. Super. 90, _, 226 A.2d 843, 846 (1967); Wilkinson
v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, _ 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972).
51. 606 P.2d at 558 (citing Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970)). Examples
given by the court were when disclosure would alarm an emotionally upset or apprehensive pa-
tient. The "therapeutic privilege" not to disclose rests much discretion with the physician on
whether to disclose or not; although disclosure might upset an apprehensive patient or an unstable
one, not disclosing information regarding the risks and alternatives seriously undermines the pa-
tient's right to decide what will be done with his body. If an undisclosed risk materializes and
causes injury to the patient, this would certainly be more disturbing than having knowledge that
such a risk might occur. See generally Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis
from Patient Sick with Serious or Fatal Illness, 19 TENN. L. REV. 349 (1946); Comment, htforlncd
Consent: The Illusion of Patient Choice, 23 EMORY L.J. 503 (1974). For a thorough discussion of
four major exceptions to informed consent: emergency, incompetency, waiver, and therapeutic
privilege, see Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine.- Striking a Balance Be-
tween Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 413.
52. 606 P.2d at 558 (citations omitted). The rationale in an emergency situation is that the
patient's consent is implied. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (4th ed. 197 1).
The patient has the burden of going forward with evidence tending to establish prima facie the
10
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The court next discussed the second element of the cause of action,
that of causation. Causation "requires that the plaintiff patient would
have chosen no treatment or a different course of treatment had the
alternatives and material risks of each been made known to him." 53
Thus, if a patient would have proceeded with the treatment even if the
physician had disclosed the risks and alternatives, the element of causa-
tion is lacking and any injury that might result would not be actiona-
ble. 4 If the patient would not have proceeded with therapy had he
been adequately informed, however, a cause of action might result.
The Scott court then considered which standard to apply to determine
causation.
Scott recognized that Canterbury, although emphasizing principles
of self-determination, permitted liability only if nondisclosure would
have affected the decision of a fictitious "reasonable patient," although
the actual patient might testify that he would have elected to forego
therapy had he been fully informed. 5  The Oklahoma court stated that
[tlhe Canterbury view certainly severely limits the protection
granted an injured patient. To the extent that plaintiff, given
an adequate disclosure, would have declined the proposed
treatment, and a reasonable person in similar circumstances
would have consented, a patient's right of self-determination
is irrevocably lost. This basic right to know and decide is the
reason for the full disclosure rule. Accordingly, we decline to
jeopardize this right by the imposition of the "reasonable
man" standard. 6
Therefore, the court held that the jury, in future cases, 57 must be in-
structed that, if the plaintiff patient would have refused the treatment
essential elements of the cause of action. The burden of proving an exception to his duty and a
privilege not to disclose as an affirmative defense is upon the physician. 606 P.2d at 558.
53. 606 P.2d at 558.
54. Id. As the court stated, "A patient obviously has no complaint if he would have submit-
ted to the treatment if the physician had complied with his duty and informed him of the risks."
Id. One alternative is that there be no test of causation at all; under this rule, the duty owed
would be that of disclosure per se, and the harm that occurs would not be the bad results from the
treatment, but the failure to disclose. See Meisel, supra note 3, at 110 n. 169. An intermediate
position is that of requiring that the patient demonstrate that the information that was withheld
was material to the decisionmaking process. Id.
55. 606 P.2d at 558.
56. Id. at 559 (emphasis in original). The court also stated that "if a plaintiff testifies he
would have continued with the proposed treatment had he been adequately informed, the trial is
over under either the subjective or objective approach. Ifhe testifies he would not, then the causa-
tion problem must be resolved by examining the credibility of plaintiffs testimony." Id.
57. "Because we are imposing a new duty on physicians, we hereby make this opinion pro-
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he is to prevail.58 The majority of jurisdictions have rejected this sub-
jective approach, fearing the placing of a physician at the mercy of the
patient's hindsight if that approach is adopted. 9 The Oklahoma
court's imposition of a subjective standard was not viewed as an unrea-
sonable burden on the physician as the majority of jurisdictions con-
tended. As the Scott court noted, "Although it might be said this
approach places a physician at the mercy of a patient's hindsight, a
careful practitioner can always protect himself by insuring that he has
adequately informed each patient he treats. If he does not breach this
duty, a causation problem will not arise." 60
The doctrine of informed consent is premised on the right of an
individual to make his own decisions concerning the kind of medical
care that he wishes to undergo or forego, regardless of the rationality of
his reasoning.6' The subjective test of causation is thus far more conso-
nant with the underlying rationale for informed consent than is the ob-
jective test.62 Canterbury, in rejecting a subjective approach, was
skeptical of the plaintiff's ability to admit, after the medical procedure,
that he would have elected treatment even if adequate disclosure had
been made.63 It is reasonable to assume, however, that jurors hearing
an informed consent case in Oklahoma in the future, will also be skep-
tical when they have the opportunity to evaluate the evidence and
weigh the credibility of the witnesses.' 4 Questions about the influence
of hindsight and bitterness are traditional issues that a jury must con-
58. Id.
59. 464 F.2d at 791; Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, _, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
515-16 (1972). See also Seidelson, supra note 19, at 329-30.
60. 606 P.2d at 559. One authority has stated that the subjective standard of causation is
unsatisfactory
because there exists a class of patients who are injured in more than a dignitary manner
by a physician's silence and are, nevertheless, unable to sustain the burden of proof
under either the subjective or objective standard for establishing causation. Included in
this class is the patient who might have withheld consent had the disclosure been
made. . . .This class. . . should be given a remedy by a judicial rule that a plaintiff can
satisfy the causation requirement by showing that he might have withheld consent, that
is, by showing that he does not know what his response to the information would have
been.
Riskin, Informed Consent: Lookingfor the Action, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 580, 604 (emphasis in origi-
nal).
61. "Although we have high regard for the professionalism of the medical community, the
standard of disclosure exercised therein bears no inherent relationship to the amount of
knowledge that any particular patient might require in order to make an informed choice."
Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, _, 286 A.2d 647, 650 (1971). See also Waltz &
Scheunerman, supra note 14, at 642; 75 HARV. L. REv. 1445 (1962).
62. Meisel, supra note 3, at 112.
63. 464 F.2d at 790-91.
64. Meisel, supra note 3, at 113. See also Seidelson, supra note 19, at 330.
[Vol. 15:665
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sider, as well as the problems of self-serving testimony in general.65
This problem does not justify abrogating the right at issue-the right of
individual choice, which includes the right to choose a course of treat-
ment that a majority of other patients would not choose.66 Since differ-
ent doctors approach similar cases in diametrically opposed ways,
equally varying responses by patients should be considered "reason-
able."6 7 The purpose of the informed consent doctrine is not to en-
courage uniformity in medical treatment, but to preserve individual
choice.68 The Oklahoma court recognized the inconsistency which re-
sults when an objective standard is used and chose to preserve the pa-
tient's right of self-determination.69
V. CONCLUSION
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Scott v. Bradford70  placed
prime importance on the patient's right of self-determination and af-
forded that right considerable protection by adopting a subjective stan-
dard in determining whether a risk is material and whether a patient
would have consented had he been adequately informed of those mate-
rial risks and alternatives of the proposed treatment. The use of this
standard is essential to the preservation of the patient's individual
choice. The adoption of the subjective standard by the Oklahoma
court, and the persuasive reasons for doing so, will perhaps encourage
other courts to examine the basic inconsistency that results when the
objective standard is used. Scott may prove to be as influential and
revolutionary as was Canterbury v. Spence.7
Karen Ivy
65. [T]he jury is likely to realize that, self-interest aside, the plaintiff may find it difficult
to know factually whether or not he would have consented, given an adequate disclosure,
before suffering the ultimate adverse consequences. . . .It is difficult to understand why
that jury determination would become less reliable if the subjective standard were em-
ployed.
Seidelson, supra note 19, at 331 (citing DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA STANDARDIZED JURY INSTRUC-
TION No. 31 (rev. ed. 1968)).
66. Katz, supra note 13, at 164. See generally Comment, Informed Consent After Cobbs-
Has the Patient Been Forgotten?, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 913 (1973).
67. Katz, supra note 13, at 163.
68. Id.
69. There are aspects of the doctrine of informed consent that are just beginning to be ex-
plored by the courts, e.g., the extent to which a patient understands the information that has been
disclosed to him before his consent is valid. See Meisel, supra note 3, at 113.
70. 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
71. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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